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I have a client whose case is before the California Supreme
Court in which the issue is the constitutionality of the California
Sexually Violent Predator Law' (SVP). I have other clients involved
in the prison system who have been committed for crimes. I would
like to talk about broader policy issues that are raised by the Hen-
dricks2  e and by the questions that I think we have to answer relat-
ing to what we do with people who commit violent sex crimes. Are
we going to pass our laws just in response to public outcry, or should
we have a more informed system that tries to deal with the problem,
that tries to provide treatment to the individual, and be honest with
what we are trying to do?
In order to answer these questions, I think we need to have per-
spective and not just look at this from a lawyer's standpoint of chal-
lenging the constitutionality of laws such as the SVP law. In Califor-
nia, prior to the SVP law, we had what was known as the Mentally
Disordered Offender (MDO) law, which was in the Penal Code, sec-
* Partner, Klein & Crain, Santa Monica, California, private practice criminal
law and prison law; former Adjunct Professor UCLA School of Law 1975-81; J.D.,
UCLA School of Law.
1. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West Supp. 1998). The
author is lead counsel in Hubbart v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1162,
58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 273 (1996), rev. granted, 1997 Cal. LEXIS 1008 (Feb. 26,
1997) (ordered temporarily depublished pending Supreme Court review), one of
a series of cases pending before the California Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the SVP law on various grounds. These include (1) ex post
facto violation, since the law applies to those presently in prison or on parole; (2)
equal protection violation, since the law does not require present dangerousness
as do other civil commitment schemes; and (3) substantive due process violation,
since the definition of "sexually violent predator" is overly broad.
2. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). In Hendricks, a challenge to
a Kansas civil commitment law regarding sexually violent predators was narrowly
upheld, 5-4, with Justice Thomas as the swing vote. See id. at 2076. The high
Court upheld constitutional challenges against substantive due process, ex post
facto, and double jeopardy claims. See id. at 2086. The Court did not have be-
fore it an equal protection challenge such as the one before the California Su-
preme Court.
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tion 2960, in California.3 Before that we had the Mentally Disor-
dered Sex Offender (MDSO) law.4 The MDSO law was designed to
suspend the criminal proceedings and treat people in mental hospi-
tals and in state hospitals. We did away with the MDSO law in Cali-
fornia because we felt it was a dishonest way of saying what we were
really doing to these people when we locked them up in state hospi-
tals, which was just punish them for what they were doing, and also
raised the question of whether or not you could really provide treat-
ment for these types of offenders.
So during the seventies we switched in California from an inde-
terminate sentence law to a determinate sentence law, which means
that offenders who are convicted of these types of crimes will be re-
leased on parole.5
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2960 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (repealed by
Stats. 1981, c. 928, p. 3485, § 2). The new SVP law was consciously placed in the
Welfare and Institutions Code in anticipation of an ex post facto challenge to the
new law. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 88 6600-6609 (West Supp. 1998). The
MDO law is found at California Penal Code §§ 2960-2981, enacted in 1981 and as
modified as a result of People v. Gibson, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1425, 252 Cal. Rptr. 56
(1988). The author was counsel in Gibson, which held the MDO law unconstitu-
tional as violative of the ex post facto and equal protection clauses. See id. at
1434-35, 1440-41, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 61, 65. The MDO law was amended to be
prospective only to resolve the ex post facto challenge and added a requirement
of present dangerousness to resolve the equal protection challenge. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2962 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
4. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6300-6322 (West 1984 & Supp. 1998)
(repealed by Stats. 1981, c. 928, 3485, § 2). For a discussion of the Mentally Dis-
ordered Sex Offender (MDSO) law, see People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535
P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975) and People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338,535 P.2d
373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170-1170.95 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998) (effective
July 1, 1977). See also, In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr.
552 (1975) (stating: "[B]ecause [Adult Authority] has determined that petitioner
is not ready for parole, it has either failed to fulfill its obligation to fix petitioner's
term at a number of years proportionate to his offense, or, having impliedly fixed
it at life [citation omitted], has imposed excessive punishment on him."); April
Kesteil Cassou and Brian Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The
New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5 (1978) (a detailed survey of California's 1978
determinate sentence law subsequent to its enactment);-Paula A. Johnson, Senate
Bill 42-The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 133
(1977) (examining the indeterminate sentencing system and its administration
and evaluating the Act's ability to alleviate the difficulties of indeterminate sen-
tencing); Raymond I. Parnas and Michael B. Salerno, The Influence Behind,
Substance and Impact of the New Determinate Sentencing Law in California, 11
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 29 (1978) (tracing the background and purposes of the Cali-
fornia Determinate Sentencing Act and surveying the potential problems and
advantages of its implementation).
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In California everybody is placed on parole, which starts after
you serve your fixed sentence.7 And so we had this gap about what
we were going to do with these violent sex offenders because we did
not have an MDSO law anymore, and we were just punishing people
for what they did. And so somebody thought up passing a "mentally
disordered offender" law, which is really not very different from the
SVP that was passed in California. It is not very different from the
Kansas law,9 except that the definition of "mentally disordered of-
fender"1 was really much more based upon the diagnosis that would
be found in the DSM" and it was more limited in its time frames than
the SVP law.12 The same kinds of legal challenges immediately came
to the forefront in California in the mid-eighties when this law was
passed. The first question was: Can you apply it to people in prison
who are about to be released on parole? Can you apply it retroac-
tively to lengthen their sentences-the ex post facto question. And
the other question is: Are they being treated differently, these of-
fenders, because the law requires that they be proved to be danger-
ous before we can lock them up as mentally disordered offenders?
The California courts in the mid-eighties did not have any prob-
lem striking down the MDO law on the ground that there was not
any requirement in the statute that they be "presently dangerous." 
14
But the legal challenge is really a short-sighted way to deal with the
problem because these are legislative questions. It is really easy for
the legislature to write an MDO law or an SVP law that is only going
to apply to people in the future. It is only going to apply to people
who we specifically require to be presently dangerous. And, of
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2930-2935 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
8. See supra note 3.
9. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 - 59-29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
11. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsORDERS xxi (4th ed. 1994) (describing a mental disor-
der as a "behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an indi-
vidual and that is associated with present distress... or disability... or with a
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important
loss of freedom.").
12 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West Supp. 1998).
13. See Gibson, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1425,252 Cal. Rptr. 56.
14. See, e.g., In re Hofferber, 28 Cal. 3d 161, 616 P.2d 836, 167 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1980); Gibson at 1434, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 61; People v. Blackwell, 117 Cal. App.
3d 372, 172 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1981).
15. The present version of the MDO law is such an example, as amended in
response to Gibson. See supra note 3.
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course, that is what the California legislature did after the court held
the law was unconstitutional; all it did was postpone, for a few years,
the ability of the state to confine these individuals as mentally disor-
dered offenders."5 And if the legal challenge in the Hendricks case
was successful on ex post facto grounds, all that would do is postpone
the ability of the state to lock up Mr. Hendricks because what trig-
gers the law is that Mr. Hendricks had committed a crime and was in
prison. If he had not been in prison, then the Kansas law would not
apply to him, and that is really what the legislature is trying to deal
with in these kinds of cases, which is a gap in our public policy about
what we are going to do with these supposedly dangerous individuals.
The question is: are they presently dangerous because of what
they did in the past? Because the new definition, especially in the
SVP law-and which Justice Thomas did not have any problem with
under substantive due process-is basically, if an individual commit-
ted these crimes in the past and we think he is going to do it in the fu-
ture, then are we going to lock up the individual under one of these
civil commitment laws?
17
And Justice Thomas did not have any problem with that. He
basically said, "That is fine." Basically what we have Justice Thomas
saying is that it is really easy for the legislature to write a law that is
going to eventually pass constitutional muster to lock people up po-
tentially for the rest of their lives without providing them with treat-
ment.18 That, to me, is the very serious public policy question that
16. In other words, the MDO law became effective in 1982. Since it initially
was applied retroactively, it was held violative of ex post facto. See Gibson, 204
Cal. App. 3d at 1432-35, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 58-61. When the amended MDO law
became effective on July 1, 1986, it was applied prospectively only. Thus, the
MDO law was not effective between 1982 and July 1986 because of the legisla-
ture's attempt to apply it retroactively.
17. Citing the Kansas SVP statute, Justice Thomas noted that a sexually vio-
lent predator is "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexu-
ally violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-
29a02(a)).
18. Justice Thomas stated:
[I]t would be of little value to require treatment as a precondi-
tion for civil confinement of the dangerously insane when no
acceptable treatment existed. To conclude otherwise would
obligate a State to release certain confined individuals who
were both mentally ill and dangerous simply because they could
not be successfully treated for their afflictions.
Id at 2084; cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("[I]t remains a stubborn fact that there are many forms of mental
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needs to be addressed. If that is what the public wants, it is really not
civil commitment because you are not providing treatment-you are
really just punishing somebody for what they did in the past.'9 To me,
it just brings up the specter of the old indeterminate sentence law,
which is what we decided in the seventies was not a fair system. We
were not really rehabilitating people in prison.
What should we do? Let us be up front. We will tell somebody
how much time they are going to be punished for what they did. We
will punish them for what theq, did, and they can be released and they
will go about their business. If they violate the law, we will punish
them again. But what is happening in many jurisdictions is that peo-
ple are not satisfied with that. Or there are certain groups of people
for whom it is difficult to predict future dangerousness, or for certain
groups of people for whom we think that what they did in the past
was so bad that we want to lock them up, potentially, for the rest of
their lives. 21 What the legislature is doing is switching back from de-
terminate sentence laws to indeterminate sentence laws.z2
That is what is happening with the individuals such as those who
are sexually violent predators. My proposition is that these SVP laws
are really nothing more than a perpetual indeterminate sentence for
these offenders and that the really honest and fair way to deal with
these individuals, if that is what the public and the legislature want, is
to pass an indeterminate sentence law. Such a law would say that
somebody who commits a sex offense, a child molester or a rapist-
could be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.u The prob-
lem with that is, of course, that we have a system in California that
deals with murderers and kidnappers and robbery. They are pun-
illness which are not understood, some which are untreatable in the sense that no
effective therapy has yet been discovered for them, and that rates of 'cure' are
generally low."); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) ("The
fact that at present there may be little likelihood of recovery does not defeat fed-
eral power to make this initial commitment of the petitioner.").
19. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600(a), 6601(a) (West Supp. 1998).
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998), § 1170
(West 1985 & Supp. 1998), § 3000 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
21. For example, the punishment for attempted first degree murder is now
seven years to life. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). The
legislature could, for example, change the punishment for rape from a determi-
nate term of three, six, or eight years to an indeterminate term of seven years to
life. See id § 264 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3040-3065 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 2400-2411 (1997); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537
P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975); In re Fain, 65 Cal. App. 3d 376, 135 Cal. Rptr.
543 (1976).
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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ished, theoretically, for the rest of their lives, but they are eligible for
parole.24 What has happened to the public client that we have in Cali-
fornia is that the parole board is not letting anybody out even if they
are rehabilitated. So that is another public policy question that has to
be dealt with.
It has become even worse in California because of clients such as
the one I represent in the California Supreme Court, who was con-
victed of an offense back in 1990. He got a determinate sentence for
what he did, and he was eligible to be released on parole about three
or four years later. Under the determinate sentence law, they have to
let you out after you serve your fixed sentence. The way the Cali-
fornia law is defined, parole immediately follows the imprisonment,
unless the parole system decides to waive parole2 ---which never hap-
pens, of course, in California. This client was about to be released on
parole and it just so happened that he was one of the poster boys in
California for Governor Wilson's reelection campaign.26 Governor
Wilson chose to mention his name prominently in his State of the
State speech in Californiae and some of the different newspapers in
the state chose to do articles about what is going to happen to these
sex offenders because they are really not mentally disordered offend-
28ers.
What are we going to do with them? We are just going to let
them out and they are going to go out and re-offend. So, some intel-
ligent lawyer who works for the state thought: "Why do we have to
let them out on parole? This is a mentally ill person because he is
dangerous. He is going to re-offend sometime in the future." And
because parole is not something that you have to agree to in Califor-
nia-it is not a contract where you have to agree to conditions and
negotiate it-it is mandatory under the law.29 The law is also that the
state can impose whatever conditions are constitutional. So there is a
standard condition of parole in California which says, "I agree to go
back to prison if I am mentally ill and dangerous to myself or oth-
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190, 209 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998), § 3046
(West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
25. See 15 C.F.R. § 2400 et seq.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 300 (West 1988 § Supp.
1998).
26. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Rallies for 'One Strike' Law, L.A.
TiMEs, Mar. 24, 1994, at B1.
27. See Governor Pete Wilson, 1995 State of the State Address (last modified
Jan. 9, 1995) <http://www.ca.gov/s/governor/sos95.html>.
2& See, e.g., Sex Offender Case Will Go to High Court, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28,
1997, at A22; Weintraub, supra note 26, at B1.
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3000,3060.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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ers."3  It sounds, of course, just like the standard mental health
commitment law in California, the Lanterman-Petris-Short 
Act,31
which is a civil commitment law which is done in court: You have a
right to counsel,3 2 you have a right to jury trial if they are going to
lock you up for an extended period of time.33 The courts have inter-
preted that to mean that there has to be some proof of present dan-
gerousness. 34 And of course this particular client, the only reason
they wanted to lock him up after he served his determinate sentence
was because he was on the front page of the newspaper and because
Governor Wilson had mentioned him in his State of the State speech.
What they did was that they never let him out on parole. They just
said, "We are going to violate your parole because you are mentally
ill and dangerous in the community." And they got a prison psychia-
trist to interview him, and the psychiatrist wrote a report, and they
held a parole violation hearing3 in a little room in the prison. Parole
in California is for up to three years,3' but he never got out on parole
for three years. They just violated his parole for one-year periods
based on the report of the psychiatrist who, of course, had preor-
dained what the result was going to be.37
Curiously, I am sort of a manic to prepare these cases. I went
and looked at every file in preparing for this first parole violation
hearing to see what kind of evidence there was besides the report of
the psychiatrist. This psychiatrist had written a memo to his own file
about the interview that he conducted with my client. It was an all-
day interview at a prison out in Chino, and he took a break for lunch.
The memo to the file said, "I received a telephone call from the Di-
rector of Corrections in California who wanted to know how my in-
terview with this poster boy was coming. I let him know that we were
30. See id& § 3000, 3057; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2616(a)(7) (1997); In re
Naito, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1656, 1660-61,231 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508 (1986).
31. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984).
32. See id §§ 5226, 5302 (West 1984).
33. See id. § 5303 (West 1984).
34. See Gibson, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1442,252 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
35. This hearing is also known as a "psychiatric return hearing."
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
37. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2646(d) (1997); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (due process requires conditional right to counsel at parole
revocation hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-89 (1972) (due proc-
ess requires procedural protection at parole revocation hearing, including notice
of charges, right to present evidence and confront adverse witnesses and a writ-
ten summary of the decision); In re Love, 11 Cal. 3d 179, 185, 520 P.2d 713, 716,
113 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1974) (due process requires conditional right to counsel at
parole revocation hearing).
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having a good conversation and I was going to write my report based
upon what I thought was appropriate. 3 ' This individual spent his
entire parole period in a hospital, in a prison. He did his time in
prison first-he did not get any treatment there. There really is no
treatment in prison for sexually violent predators. 39 He would have
to be discharged under California law because it was a determinate
sentence, and parole ends after a period of time." He did not qualify
as a mentally disordered offender because not even the state psychia-
trist had ever diagnosed him with anything under the DSM that
qualified as anything other than an anti-social personality.41 Gover-
nor Wilson saw this loophole that we had in California and that is
where the Sexually Violent Predator Law came in. In California
there is a much broader definition of the person who is a sexually
violent predator.42 He was going to be discharged from parole on
January 15, 1996, which is right after the law went into effect.43
I had another client whose name was also on the front page of a
lot of newspapers, and his parole period ended the middle of Decem-
ber 1995. They did not have the ability to do anything with him be-
cause the definition in the sexually violent predator law has always
been connected with being in prison or on parole.44 It really is not
necessary-and probably, to not be subject to challenges, it would be
even better if the laws were drafted broadly to apply to the public
and not just to people who are in prison or on parole. 5 Curiously
38. Memorandum from Dr. Barry Bass to James Gomez, California Director
of Corrections regarding Christopher Hubbart (Mar. 16, 1994) (on file with
author).
39. See letter from Dr. Nadium Khoury, Assistant Deputy Director Health
Care Policy, California Department of Corrections, to Shanti Bright, Prison Law
Office (Aug. 13, 1997) (on file with author).
40. The maximum period of parole for the typical determinately-sentenced
prisoner is three years. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
41. See id. § 2962(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the term "severe
mental disorder" does not apply to personality disorders).
42. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West Supp. 1998).
43. See id. §§ 6600-6608 (West Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
44. See id. §§ 6600(a), 6601(a) (West Supp. 1998).
45. The pertinent provisions of the Kansas law Justice Thomas refers to in
Hendricks provide:
When it appears that a person may meet the criteria of a sexu-
ally violent predator as defined in K.S.A. 59-29a02 and
amendments thereto, the agency with jurisdiction shall give
written notice of such to the attorney general and the multidis-
ciplinary team established in subsection (d), 90 days prior to:
(1) The anticipated release from total confinement of a
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense,
except that in the case of persons who are returned to prison
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAW
enough, if you read the Kansas law at issue in the Hendricks case,
there is a provision in it that requires the jury to make a special find-
ing that the individual is a sexually violent predator s but no require-
ment that the person presently be serving a prison sentence or pres-
ently be on parole, as opposed to the California law which does have
that requirement. 47 And that, of course, makes it sound much, much
more like punishment in California than in Kansas-although I ex-
pect to lose my argument in front of the California Supreme Court
also just because the client base is not a particularly popular one. So
what we have done in California is much more "Machiavellian" than
the SVP law. We have taken these individuals and turned their pa-
role period into another part of the punishment under the guise of
treatment.
I have another case going on that is related to this discussion. It
is a class action in federal court about whether or not it is a violation
of equal protection or due process to hold a psychiatric return hear-
ing without the procedural protections of a jury trial and a higher
burden of proof and without finding a violation of a condition of pa-
role." It is really much more like a civil commitment without any
for no more than 90 days as a result of revocation of postrelease
supervision, written notice shall be given as soon as practicable
following the person's readmission to prison;
(2 release of a person who has been charged with a
y violent offense and who has been determined to be in-
competent to stand trial pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3305 and
amendments thereto;
(3) release of a person who has been found not guilty by
reason of insanity o a sexually violent offense pursuant to
K.S.A. 22-3428 and amendments thereto; or
4 release of a person who has been found not guilty of a
sexualy violent ofense pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3428, and
amendments thereto, and the jury who returned the verdict of
not guilty answers in the affirmative to the special question
asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3221.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
According to Justice Thomas, the Kansas law only uses prior criminal
conduct, "solely for evidentiary purposes ... to demonstrate that a 'mental ab-
normality' exists or to [show] ... future dangerousness... [T]he Kansas Act
does not make a criminal conviction a prerequisite for commitment [since those]
absolved of criminal responsibility may nonetheless be subject to confinement..
." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
46. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. 1996); Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. at 2077.
47. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a) (West Supp. 1998).
48. See Hubbart v. Nielsen, No. CIV S-95-1129 (E.D. Cal. filed June 20,
1995). For other cases related to this, see Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-
15 (1966) (holding New York civil commitment statute denied prisoner equal
protection because it allowed jury review and a judicial determination of danger-
April 1998]
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treatment. In California, part of the pleadings in my case, we were
lucky enough to receive a response to an innocent inquiry to the
prison system about what kind of treatment they provide to prisoners
who are sexually violent risk predators while they are in prison being
punished or on parole. Of course, the answer is none, and that was
the answer that we got in a letter from the Chief Medical Officer for
the prison system, and we attached that as part of our pleadings in
the California Supreme Court.49 It is sort of an interesting problem
that we have in California.
The other point that I wanted to raise in this discussion is that
these laws where we are going to lock these people up either through
parole violations or through court proceedings, they basically rely on
the testimony of experts. In the parole violation settings there is just
one expert from the state. The answer is preordained. They nor-
mally do not even let us gresent our own expert, which is probably a
violation of due process. But by the time we get a court to look at
it, the time for the violation is up and the issue becomes moot,51 so it
is very difficult to deal with it. With these SVP law cases there is a
jury trial and the state has experts. 2 If the person is indigent, he has
the right to ask the state to appoint experts." Basically, what you
come down to is whether or not mental health experts can predict fu-
ture violence in these areas.4 The question I raise is: Should we be
turning our commitment systems into areas where we are basically
turning over the decision to mental health experts about predicting
future violence-unless I am being particularly naive-and really
what is happening here is that these people are just being locked up
because of what they did in the past. Of course, if that is what it is,
then maybe we should just be more honest and punish people under
the indeterminate sentence law for the rest of their lives for whatever
ousness to those subject to civil commitment, except mentally ill offenders) and
Gibson, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1435-43,252 Cal. Rptr. 61-67 (holding California civil
commitment statute denied prisoner equal protection because it required proof
of future dangerousness as to all persons subject to involuntary commitment, ex-
cept mentally disordered offenders).
49. See Khoury, supra note 38.
50. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 2668, 2677 (1997); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
479-80; In re Johnson, 35 Cal. App. 4th 160, 169-72, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 449, 455-57
(1995).
51. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3057 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (providing that
the maximum parole violation is one year).
5Z See CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE § 6605(d) (West Supp. 1998).
53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3057 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
54. See People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 767-75, 631 P.2d 446, 466-71, 175
Cal. Rptr. 738,758-63 (1981).
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they did.
Thank you.
Question and Answer Session
Q: One of the things you mentioned was the old MDSO that got
thrown on the scrap heap last year because of his punishment, one of
the criteria on the MDSO was that you could not identify someone as
an MDSO unless they were amenable to treatment. That was a re-
quirement to be labeled an MDSO. And one of the issues that I want
to deal with is the treatment. If that was such an essential point, how
did that get so lost in all of this?
A: I think what has happened-I do not know if my point is
relatively clear here-but I think what has happened here is these are
political decisions that are being made to incapacitate a small group
of individuals probably for the rest of their lives for whatever they
did. If you read Justice Thomas's reasoning in the Hendricks case, he
basically is up front and says it does not matter whether or not the
person is amenable to treatment.55 I think what the legislatures are
realizing is that if they require amenability to treatment, they are not
going to be able to lock up people who mental health professionals
would say are not amenable to treatment. Or there is no such treat-
ment that is available for these people, which, to me, just puts it back
to the question I am suggesting which is: if what we are just going to
do is punish people for what they did in the past, then let us just say
that and forget about involving the mental health system into what
we are doing with these individuals.
55. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(d) (West Supp. 1998); supra note
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